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Ian D. Armour’s book is a perfect example of  a work of  diplomatic history that 
is “total” in its approach, by which I mean that it sets aims far more ambitious 
than those of  traditional (and also quite numerous) analyses of  bilateral relations, 
and it also surpasses these traditional studies in the scholarly standards it meets. 
Armour’s primary contention is that, after 1867, not only did new possibilities 
emerge for Hungarians to play roles in foreign policy, but opportunities also 
emerged for Hungarians to further their foreign interests, even though in principle 
the Compromise did not create any formal or institutional framework for this 
(formally, the Compromise only allowed for a single, “imperial” foreign policy). 
The foreign policy pursued by Hungarians often differed significantly from and 
even ran against the “imperial” ideas and interests, both in its goals and, even 
more frequently, in its means. One clear example of  this was the appointment of  
the later common Foreign Minister and administrator of  the Condominium of  
Bosnia and Hercegovina Benjamin Kállay to serve as consul in Belgrade in 1868, 
when at the same time Anton Prokesch-Osten, the ambassador in Istanbul, was 
a representative of  the Austrian imperial idea. Another example would be the 
support given by Hungarians for Michael Obrenović, who had a Hungarian wife 
and estates in Hungary, and their opposition to the Karađorđević family, which 
was hardly beloved of  the Hungarian nation because of  the role it had played 
in 1848. For Austria, the Karađorđević family was emblematic of  loyalty to the 
dynasty. In the background, the two Ministers of  Foreign Affairs, Friedrich Beust 
and Gyula Andrássy, represented contradictory conceptions and ideologies. 
The former supported a foreign policy that focused on western Europe, while 
Andrássy promised a more active anti-Russian foreign policy in the Balkans. At 
the same time Andrássy and Kállay initially rejected the acquisition of  Bosnia, 
in marked contrast with the aspirations of  the Emperor, Beust and his circles. 
Andrássy opposed the idea of  an essentially Southern Slav Balkan/Danubian 
Federation in the interests of  protecting the Monarchy, and his opposition had 
an anti-Russian edge. At same time, he was apprehensive about the strengthening 
of  the Slavic peoples within the Monarchy, which he feared might weaken 
the dualist structure of  the state. For Kállay, the Danubian Confederation 
represented a counterweight to Habsburg rule (precisely these two reasons were 
behind his support for the idea of  pledging Bosnia to Serbia—in other words, 
BOOK REVIEWS
431
he was not influenced by a Romantic vision of  Southern Slav brotherhood, but 
rather by political self-interest). While Kállay may have been the first Hungarian 
follower of  John Stuart Mill, his notion of  liberalism was nonetheless very distant 
from that of  the Englishman. The notion of  a Danubian confederation as a 
counterweight to Habsburg rule may perhaps have fit into this framework, but 
for instance the role that Kállay exerted in the Karađorđević trial (a role driven 
by political interests) was in stark contradiction with the principles of  classical 
liberalism. Added to all this was the Croatian question and the problem of  the 
relationship to Serbia and Hungary of  the Serbs of  Voivodina, who had become 
more important pieces on the political chess board, since the fate of  Bosnia was 
of  key importance from the perspective of  winning—or losing—their trust.
Obviously, Armour’s “total” approach is rife with complexity and risk given 
the complicacy of  the network of  relationships. The divergent visions of  Beust 
and Andrássy make an analysis of  the relationships between Prussia and France 
indispensable. Indeed, an analysis of  Hungarian–Croatian, Austrian–Croatian, 
and Serb–Croatian relations is similarly indispensable to a nuanced understanding 
of  Hungary’s foreign policy ambitions. The prevailing domestic situation 
exerted a significant influence of  Hungarian foreign policy, the essential goal 
of  which was to ensure the viability of  Dualism and dismantle the movements 
among the national minorities within the Empire. From this perspective, it was 
not at all obvious, for instance, that Andrássy, who was seen as liberal, would 
proffer Hungary’s support for the liberal-nationalist party in Voivodina and the 
Serbian nationalist party in Serbia. Indeed, it seemed far more likely that they 
would enjoy the support of  the conservative groups (who favored a limited 
constitution and strong central power), for instance Milivoje Blaznavac, who 
served as Minister of  Defense and later regent, or Prince Michael. However, 
this support only seemed likely, for the fault lines in Serbian politics appeared 
not only on the ideological plane, but also in foreign policy orientation, and 
these fault lines did not overlap. Not every liberal was also pro-Russian, and 
not every conservative was pro-Austrian. The elements of  French ideology that 
influenced Serbian politicians could be favorable (the idea of  the nation state) or 
unfavorable (liberalism, nationalism) from the perspective of  Hungarian foreign 
policy.
These complex networks of  relationships and inclinations in domestic 
and foreign policy must be analyzed both from the Hungarian and the Serbian 
perspective, and this creates further complications. The Serbian prince had to 
appease public opinion, which called for the liberation of  the oppressed Slavic 
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peoples, while also giving due consideration to the actual political constellation. 
It is hardly surprising that Armour has chosen 1867 as the starting point for 
his analysis, since with the defeat of  the Austrian Empire at the Battle of  
Königgrätz a new European great power came into existence, namely Prussia, 
and Austria had to reassess its role and position in Europe, as well as its goals. 
The Habsburg Empire had effectively been pushed out of  Western Europe, and 
the compromise with Hungary meant both a new Balkan orientation and a long-
term rivalry with Russia (and Germany). Michael, Prince of  Serbia had to choose 
between a Balkan Alliance the essential function of  which was unclear (Kállay 
and his circle clearly would not have been pleased if  the Alliance had been 
created in order to attack the Ottoman Empire or if  it had acquired a defensive, 
anti-Habsburg edge) or having the support of  a great power. The question was 
which was more likely to ensure Serbia’s territorial growth and domestic and 
foreign policy stability. Bosnia was the Apple of  Discord, since Austria, Serbia, 
and Croatia all sought to claim it, and Andrássy’s original idea of  promising it 
to Serbia (this offer may or may not have been sincere, as Armour discusses 
on pp. 121-155) sowed the seeds of  discord between Austria, Croatia, and the 
Serbs of  southern Hungary and Serbia. In Armour’s assessment, originally the 
Hungarians had not intended to use Bosnia to drive a wedge between Austria, 
Croatia, and Serbia, but had pursued a genuinely “positive” foreign policy in the 
Balkans (in the service of  their aforementioned anti-Russian and in part anti-
Austrian aims). Only looking back had they realized the potential uses of  this 
“premature” promise. Of  course the idea of  giving Bosnia to Serbia also meant 
that the other parties would turn against Hungary, which is why the plan was 
later abandoned.
The approach Armour has adopted requires knowledge of  several languages, 
as well as research in a number of  different sites given the scattered nature 
of  the sources. Furthermore, since the secondary literature on the subject is 
marked by a striking one-sidedness, Armour had to show remarkable critical 
sensitivity and subtlety in his use of  the works of  other scholars. His knowledge 
of  languages (Hungarian, Serbian, and German) enables him to offer a thorough 
assessment at the beginning of  his book of  the secondary literature in these 
three languages. This in and of  itself  constitutes a significant strength of  his 
study in comparison with the relatively one-sided works, which are more limited 
in their use of  sources and, hence, their perspectives. Armour’s book is the first 
work in English in which the Serbian, Austrian, and Hungarian primary sources 
and secondary literature are given appropriate (and balanced) emphasis. (The 
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bibliography itself  is twenty pages long.) In addition, he also discussed his ideas 
in person with other scholars on the subject (for instance Imre Ress). 
The only weakness of  his book lies precisely in its comprehensiveness 
and the array of  perspectives it adopts. While the manner in which he presents 
contrasting stances in the historiography and identifies contradictions which 
arise from the one-sidedness of  the existing secondary literature, Armour’s 
own argumentation is not persuasive precisely because of  this multiplicity of  
perspectives. It is often complex and circuitous, or it rests on assumptions 
(for instance, the contentions he makes concerning the hypothetical goal of  
Andrássy’s agreements concerning Bosnia in 1867/68, pp.19–55, 121–55). At 
the same time, the structure of  the book is logical, balanced, and proportional. 
The individual chapters address clearly identified diplomatic problems, and 
consequently the shifts in foreign policy are similarly clear and accessible to 
analysis. The emphasis on the events of  1870–1871 is also understandable, since 
the great power constellation (the Franco–Prussian War) and the maneuverings 
of  the small states and their search for allies are all presented, along with the 
situation of  the Bosniaks (pp.155–259). Armour could have devoted a few more 
pages to the events of  1875–1878to discuss the ideas and aspirations of  the 
Russians, the British, and the Austro–Hungarians (pp.259–83). Fundamentally, 
the reader gets the very clear impression that the foreign policy of  the Hungarians 
was based not on any ideological principles, but rather on opportunistic attempts 
to further the interests of  the moment. On the other hand, the appointment of  
Andrássy as Minister of  Foreign Affairs constituted a sharp shift: the political 
visions and ideas which had been vying for prominence within the Monarchy 
gave way to a single, general bearing (perhaps a bit paradoxically, this general 
bearing later changed dramatically in comparison with the original logic, and 
several elements of  Beust’s vision for the Balkans were adopted).
This book was clearly written for specialists, i.e. scholars of  the diplomatic 
history of  the Balkans. It will be particularly edifying for representatives of  the 
arguably narrowly focused, (romantic) nationalist historiography of  the region, 
which always seems to be struggling to compensate a bit for the perceived 
marginality of  the region and its states. 
Gábor Demeter
